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Abstract 
If the idea of an integrated Latin America goes back to the early post-colonial days, the story of 
political and economic integration in Latin America is relatively quickly told. The attempts have been 
numerous, but in terms of policy outcomes and deep integration for the benefit of a regional public 
good, regionalism in Latin America has not lived up to the stated aims of its governments. The present 
paper takes a first step to examine the practice of referring to Latin America in the political discourse, 
a phenomenon that we term declaratory regionalism to denote its independence from substantial forms 
of regionalism. We analyse the use of declarationism in presidential speeches delivered on an annual 
basis to the UN General Assembly in two steps. First, we discuss a series of descriptive illustrations in 
light of existing scholarship on Latin American international relations. Subsequently, several 
hypotheses for why governments keep referring to the region while not necessarily privileging it in 
their foreign policy strategies are put to a test. While not offering a conclusive explanation, the results 
point to leftist ideology as a crucial factor in explaining the persistence of discursive regionalism at the 
UN General Assembly. The paper posits that future research is likely to benefit from conceiving Latin 
Americanism as a characteristic of leftist ideology. 
Keywords 
Latin America, regionalism, discursive practice. 
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1. Introduction* 
Regional integration is an idea as old as Latin America’s states themselves. Integration efforts have 
undergone a number of ups and downs, each of them accompanied by fervent enthusiasm, only to 
crackle sooner or later with a long list of pledges to deeper integration remaining unfulfilled. The 
failure of living up to the stated aims of governments and the representatives of a full panoply of 
regional institutions has been subject to scrutiny by several scholars (Domínguez 2007; Malamud and 
Gardini 2012; Rojas Aravena 2010). Noting a surprising persistence of regionalist discourse and new 
initiatives in spite of recurring setbacks, some set out to address the notable “resilience and 
consistency of the institutional arrangements […]; the mismatch between scope and level of 
integration; and poor policy outcomes” head on (Dabène 2009: 24). This paper adds to the debate with 
a content analysis of presidential discourse that seeks to uncover the “semantic macrostructure” 
(Neuendorf 2002: 8) and possible causes of Latin America’s declaratory regionalism, understood as 
the act of discursively referring to regional organizations, regional identities, and/or the macro and 
micro-regions the Latin American countries see themselves as being part of. It analyses the 
presidential speeches delivered on part of eleven Latin American states at the annual opening sessions 
of the United Nations’ General Assembly (UNGA) to capture how, when and why presidents talk 
about regionalism when laying out their key foreign policy strategies. 
The period of analysis spans the years 1994 to 2014, which saw what some called a paradigm shift 
from ‘open’ regionalism based on a neoliberal trade agenda to a new, politically oriented integration 
agenda led by a number of leftist governments (Sanahuja 2009; Riggirozzi y Tussie 2012). While ever 
since there has certainly been no shortage of dynamism on Latin America’s regional scene, real 
progress in deepening integration has remained elusive. Whether multilateral collaboration in the 
region has produced a net benefit is far from clear, and yet, regional imaginaries form undoubtedly 
part of Latin America’s political, social and cultural life, including political discourse in general and 
presidential foreign policy discourse in particular. 
Regional studies have obliterated the presence of a Latin-Americanist discourse as a characteristic 
feature of regional politics in this particular set of countries. Latin America’s institutional 
conglomerate of “coexisting and competing projects with fuzzy boundaries” (Tussie 2009: 170) may 
once have appeared puzzling from a European-style inspired view on regional integration. However, 
international institutions in developing regions generally take the form of free trade areas, regularized 
summits of heads of states or inter-governmental organizations that tend to reinforce sovereignty 
rather than to undermine it. In such cases, the study of declaratory regionalism as a phenomenon 
distinct from integration or cooperation, even if only ceremonially performed (Montecinos 1996), 
seems to be especially relevant since words not always imply deeds. 
Building on Ayoob, ‘third world’ regionalism can thus be understood as a “subaltern” regionalism 
between a number of countries grouping together to cooperate to meet similar domestic challenges 
(ibid. 1998; note: cooperate, not integrate). Contrary to expectations from (neo)functionalist theories, 
regionalism in Latin America also did not propel integration (Malamud and Schenoni 2015). The 
reasons why Latin American countries cooperate instead of integrating have been subject to 
considerable debate, yet we know little about why Latin American governments talk much about 
something they typically avoid. 
Not only is declaratory regionalism different from cooperation or integration. In fact, it must also 
have different causes, which account for the gap that generally exists between what is said and what is 
done with regards to regionalism in Latin America. While making statements is an exercise of 
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relatively low cost, it is remarkable that governments have thought it necessary to make an average of 
more than four allusions to the region in each of the speeches delivered to the UNGA over twenty-one 
years. 
Moreover, declaratory regionalism is central for a constructivist understanding of foreign policy in 
Latin America. Even if policy statements not always reflect reality – e.g. the signing of actual treaties 
– and may contain strategic lies, bluffing or partial display of information (Mearsheimer 2011), from a 
constructivist standpoint, speeches are all but cost-free since they have normative implications which 
condition future action. In the words of a significant contributor to this paradigm: “In the absence of 
evidence to the contrary, highly formal policy statements, as declaration of intention, are policies” 
(Onuf 2001: 92, italics in the original), and therefore must be taken seriously. 
This paper seeks to shed light on who in the region talks about exactly what, and to interrogate a 
possible set of explanations for discursive regionalism. It proceeds as follows. The second section 
describes the data and discusses the approach. The third and fourth parts provide a series of descriptive 
statistics on declaratory regionalism, which unpack variation across countries, contents, and 
throughout the time period considered. The findings are contrasted with some of the mainstream 
hypotheses on Latin American international politics, showing that the proposed measure of 
declarationism is in line with the expectations of regional experts with regards to these countries’ 
discourse. The fifth part seeks an explanation for the puzzle. Section 5 develops several hypotheses, 
which are put to a test in a linear regression. The significance of the results is modest, but nevertheless 
they allow inferring a number of conclusions regarding Latin America’s declaratory regionalism. Most 
importantly, the analysis identifies regime ideology as a factor meriting closer scrutiny. Possible 
explanations are discussed that sketch the way for future research before section 6 concludes. 
2. Measuring declaratory regionalism 
Executives generally play the leading part in defining foreign policy strategies, and Latin American 
presidents have exceptionally wide-ranging competences if compared to other executive powers in 
democratic regimes (Shugart and Carey 1992; O’Donell 1994). The region’s ‘summitry’ (Feinberg 
2006) is exemplary for the decisive influence of Latin American presidents in the process of foreign 
policy making (Malamud 2005; Schenoni 2015), which positions them as the central actors employing 
– or avoiding – declaratory regionalism. 
The presidential statements delivered at the opening sessions of the UNGA are a rich source to 
understand change and continuity in foreign policy. During September each year, every country 
represented at the UN delivers a speech to the world community synthetizing its foreign policy 
priorities. Since the statements are addressed to other governments but also broadcasted to local and 
global audiences, the occasion provides an exceptional opportunity for leaders to use declaratory 
regionalism as both a domestic and foreign policy tool. Even when presidents send a deputy, the 
address is usually given in the name of the head of state and outlines the main foreign policy 
objectives of the incumbent administration. By analysing the yearly speeches at the UNGA, it is thus 
possible to obtain a broad picture of Latin America’s declaratory regionalism over the past twenty 
years.  
To obtain a measure for declaratory regionalism, this paper counts the number of references that 
were made during a single speech at the UNGA - i.e. a country-year unit of analysis – to the following 
set of words: 
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Table 1. Words considered in a frequency analysis 
Regional 
Organization 
OAS CEPAL CELAC UNASUR CARICOM ALBA MERCOSUR 
Region and 
Sub-region 
Hemisphere Latin America South 
America 
Caribbean Andean 
Region 
Southern 
Cone 
Regional 
Identities 
Hemispheric Latin American South 
American 
Caribbean Andean Indigenous 
Other words Americas Region Sub-
region 
Integrate Regionalism Continental 
The words in Table 1 – and words with the same stem and different suffix, e.g. region/regional or 
Latin American/Latin-Americanism, etc. – were identified and analysed with regard to their frequency 
in a total of 231 speeches. These were the speeches delivered by the major eleven countries in Latin 
America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela) during 21 years between 1994 and 2014. 
This methodological approach has a series of advantages and disadvantages. Speech analysis is an 
unobtrusive technique that can handle a large amount of unstructured data (Krippendorff 2004: 41-43). 
The 231 statements analysed here represent how presidents stood towards regionalism at the time the 
speeches were delivered, without responding to a set of predetermined questions or being asked to take 
a position towards regionalism per se. Furthermore, the fact of being delivered at the same time, in the 
same forum and by chiefs of state themselves – or deputies directly representing them –, the analysis 
of UNGA speeches show great advantages in terms of comparability.  
On the downside, taken as a sole indicator, the UNGA speeches certainly provide a somewhat 
superficial account of how governments perceive their region. This is so for three main reasons. First, 
the UNGA is not the only and arguably not the most important venue where governments make 
foreign policy statements. Second, some speeches are lengthier than others and hence apparent interest 
in the region may be a product of plain verbosity.
1
 Most importantly, the present analysis does not 
capture the context, so some statements may refer to the region in negative terms while others may do 
so in neutral or positive terms. Understanding these nuances would require further research and the use 
of other techniques. However, given that such a research agenda has not been pursued so far, we hope 
that even a limited approach will compensate for these shortcomings with the benefit of parsimony 
and transparency. 
On balance, it is important to recognize that the UNGA speeches are only one indicator for the 
workings of regionalism in Latin America, and one not free from limitations. It is undisputable, 
however, that the mere act of referring to the region in a presidential speech demonstrates some 
interest in the subject, since governments could choose not to talk about it. To the authors’ best 
knowledge no attempt of systematically assessing data on Latin America’s declaratory regionalism has 
been undertaken so far, and the goal of the next sections is therefore to draw a number of conclusions 
building on a range of descriptive and inferential statistics. 
3. Declaratory regionalism at the UNGA: Who talks about what? 
As figure 1 shows, certain countries are more prone to develop a regional discourse than others. In 
accordance with Colombia’s scepticism regarding South American initiatives (Flemes 2012) and 
Mexico’s geographic distance, these are the two countries that refer the less to their region. In this 
context, it is worth noting that Colombia appears to attach particular value to the annual UNGA 
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meetings. Among the eleven countries analysed, Colombia was the only one represented by the 
president personally at each meeting since 1994, and not by a deputy. On the other extreme, Brazil has 
made most allusions to the region, which may be seen as an expression of its interest to assume a 
leadership role for South and Latin America on the global stage (Lima 2013; Burges 2015). 
Figure 1. Number of allusions to regionalism by country (1994-2014) 
 
Consistent with the patchwork nature of Latin American regionalism outlined above, it is also obvious 
from the data that not every country refers to the same region. Regions are malleable and open (Buzan 
and Wæver 2003; Nolte 2011), and depending on their geographic situation and their economic and 
political interests, each country builds its regional discourse around different clusters. Figure 2 shows 
how often each president has referred to the following macro-regions: South America, Latin America, 
and the Hemisphere. 
Figure 2. Number of allusions by regional cluster 
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Not surprisingly, four of the five Southern Cone countries (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay) 
refer mainly to the South American sub-region. The founding members of MERCOSUR, these 
countries refer to South America more often than their northern neighbours, which are more proximate 
to North America and therefore more strongly influenced by the United States in terms of trade, 
investment and aid.
2
 Brazil stands out from the group as it almost doubles the average number of 
references to South America made by its peers. This highlights the Brazilian origin of the concept in 
(Moniz Bandeira 2006) and Brasilia’s interest in promoting it (Teixeira 2012). The countries that have 
sought to limit Brazil’s influence in the region, including the fifth country in the Southern Cone, Chile, 
as well as Colombia (Schenoni 2015) and Venezuela (Flemes and Wehner 2015), in turn, tended to 
avoid the use of the concept. As a way of discursive contestation, they preferred to refer more broadly 
to Latin America instead, although Chavez’s Venezuela would later incorporate the South American 
discourse as well (Chodor & McCathy-Jones 2013). 
If read in conjunction with the data from figure 1, it is evident that Chile, second only to Brazil in 
its declarationist practice at the General Assembly, has been actively contesting Brazilian primacy on 
the regional scene. This claim is supported by a breakdown of references according to individual 
regional institutions, which is depicted in figure 3. 
Figure 3. Allusions to regional organizations by country (1994-2014) 
 
 
Overall, countries that talk much about the region do not necessarily refer to institutions, and Chile, in 
fact, alluded comparatively little to existing organizations. From the data presented in figure 3 Ecuador 
and Bolivia stand out as the only two countries whose addresses at the UNGA included reference to all 
six regional institutions analysed here. Their discursive regionalism appears consistent with both 
countries’ foreign policy strategies to increase and diversify their participation in international 
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organizations (Garzón 2015: 23-24). The members of MERCOSUR
3
, in turn, commented primarily on 
this trade bloc and increasingly on UNASUR (see figure 4), but were not prone to mentioning other 
institutions. 
Figure 4. Allusions to regional organizations by year 
 
The curve of references to Mercosur as shown in figure 4 reflects the trajectory of the trading bloc 
from initially high expectations to its near political stand-still following the Brazilian devaluation in 
1999 (Malamud 2005; Onuki 2006). A breeze of fresh air arrived with the new idea of a “social 
MERCOSUR” and the membership request of Venezuela (Christensen 2007: 156), but since the late-
2000s the plans to establish a common market have remained in the holding stack. Instead, new 
organizations like UNASUR and ALBA gained political relevance in the presidential discourses. With 
the exception of a brief flirt with CELAC in 2013, since 2008 UNASUR and ALBA were the two 
institutions most frequently referred to. 
It is noteworthy that the Organization of American States (OAS), the oldest and only institution 
that includes the United States, does not feature prominently in the speeches. Reflecting the 
ambiguous relation the Latin American states have long had with their great power to the north, it 
shows a similarly low, but stable record to the much smaller Andean Community (CAN). This sheds 
some doubts on earlier research that suggested UNASUR might be replacing the OAS in the regional 
strategy of the South American states (Weiffen et.al. 2013). At least with regard to discourse, 
UNASUR appears to be counterweighing the lack of enthusiasm with MERCOSUR. 
So far, the data from Latin American speeches at the UNGA have shown to be consistent with 
several patterns that are found in the region’s international politics. If this interpretation is correct and 
the presidential statements are indeed reflective of foreign policy strategies including regional 
integration, its discursive enactment should vary over time. Before venturing into a possible 
explanation for Latin America’s declaratory regionalism, the following section deals with its overall 
use at the UNGA. 
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4. Declaratory regionalism at the UNGA: Correlations and long term trends 
For the sake of simplicity, figure 5 shows the use of declaratory regionalism by the six biggest Latin 
American countries only. 
Figure 5. Declaratory regionalism in five South American countries 
 
Even so, it is difficult to discern clear patterns from the rather messy graph. Of few conclusions the 
data allow to draw, what sticks out is the fact that the presidents tend to coincide in their use of 
discursive regionalism in a temporal dimension. Table 2 correlates all regional allusions on a country-
to-country basis and highlights those in green colour that are positively associated and correlated with 
a value above .3. While there are twenty-one significant positive correlations, only two statistically 
significant negative correlations (highlighted in orange) are found. 
Table 2. Pearson correlation for declaratory regionalism (1994-2014) 
 ARG BOL BRA COL CHI ECU MEX PAR PER URU 
ARG 1          
BOL 0,45 1         
BRA 0,39 0,49 1        
COL 0,06 -0,08 0,07 1       
CHI 0,47 0,44 0,39 0,19 1      
ECU -0,01 -0,02 -0,29 0,49 -0,03 1     
MEX 0,38 0,26 0,01 0,14 0,05 -0,07 1    
PAR 0,59 0,43 0,27 -0,00 0,67 -0,02 0,48 1   
PER 0,02 -0,14 0,03 -0,13 0,11 -0,15 0,21 0,14 1  
URU 0,49 0,53 0,37 -0,33 0,21 -0,32 0,34 0,44 0,35 1 
VEN 0,26 0,36 0,14 0,20 0,31 0,51 0,00 0,26 -0,02 0,02 
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A second inference that can be drawn from the overall use of declaratory regionalism are its 
discernible peaks with regards to both the mentioning of regionalism, broadly speaking, and the 
allusion to regional institutions. Figure 6 suggests an association between regime creation, on the one 
hand, and the practice of declaratory regionalism, on the other. Even if a gap allegedly exists between 
what is said and what is done – and even between what is signed and what is done (Gardini 2011, 247) 
–, it would seem that presidents talk more about the region when institutions are being or were 
recently created. However, this claim receives no support in the inferential analysis developed in the 
next section. 
Figure 6. Declaratory regionalism by speech and year 
 
Secondly, the two-peaked distribution of declaratory regionalism in Figure 6 suggests that we should 
rethink the hypotheses that link declaratory regionalism to democratization (Oelsner 2005), the US’s 
decline (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012), and the rise of Brazil (Burges 2015), since these phenomena 
have been linear during the period under consideration. What then causes governments to refer to the 
region in whatever abstract terms in their yearly speeches at the UNGA? The following section 
discusses several plausible answers and interrogates them in a linear regression model.  
5. Hypothesizing the causes of declaratory regionalism 
The following hypotheses are derived from the literature on political-security regionalism and 
regionalism studies on Latin America. All follow an explanatory logic working at the domestic and the 
regional international level, and are expected to determine the foreign policy strategies underpinning 
Latin America’s declaratory regionalism for two reasons. On the one hand, minor powers are first and 
foremost concerned with their immediate neighbours and devise their foreign policies accordingly 
(Lake and Morgan 1997: 5). Secondly, for most countries in the region internal stability is still the 
major concern.  
Accordingly, the first hypothesis holds: 
H1. Governments foster a regionalist discourse when faced with domestic instability. 
Latin American declaratory regionalism: An analysis of presidential discourse (1994-2014) 
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Over the two decades under consideration, Latin America’s presidencies were vulnerable to internal 
competitors challenging their authority, a risk that led to prolonged periods of instability in several 
cases (Pérez Liñan 2007; Llanos and Marsteintredet 2010). When facing complicated domestic 
situations, governments frequently sought regional support from organizations like the OAS, Mercosur 
and UNASUR, which dispose of mechanisms to support democracy in the member states by applying 
international pressure (Nolte et. al. 2013). It is therefore plausible to expect governments referring to 
the region at the UNGA when presidents are facing domestic crises. The most obvious signs for 
presidential crises are popular protest and mass demonstrations (Pérez Liñan 2010). Data on “anti-
government activity” are therefore included in the regression model from the Democracy Barometer4. 
These count (a) the number of public gatherings of more than 100 people displaying their opposition 
to the government and (b) the number of strikes of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers in any 
given year. 
Somewhat contrarily, in international crises the Latin American countries have traditionally relied 
on ad hoc mechanisms and groupings of states rather than formal regional institutions. However, in 
recent inter-state crises such as between Ecuador and Peru and Colombia and Venezuela, respectively, 
the OAS, UNASUR or other regional groupings such as the Rio Group were used as a forum to diffuse 
tensions.  
Domínguez et.al. pointedly described the Latin American security architecture as one creating 
moral hazard: “The peacekeeping norms, procedures, and institutions in inter-American relations […] 
insure each member-state against the likelihood of protracted warfare. States can behave recklessly, 
militarizing disputes to serve domestic political objectives, certain that international agents will stop 
the fighting” (ibid. 2003: 6, 14; see also Malamud and Schenoni 2015). However, it is also true that 
when these crises occur, governments often recur to the region in the search of external support or 
mediation. Hence, 
H2. Presidents foster a regionalist discourse when involved in inter-state militarized disputes. 
To test this hypothesis, data from the Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) database 
were gathered that account for the involvement of Latin American countries in external conflict 
between 1994 and 2012 (Ghosn et.al. 2004).  
Alternatively, declaratory regionalism may reflect national election cycles. Presidents who either 
seek re-election or are involved in an electoral campaign in a one-year period after the UNGA plenary 
sessions can use this platform to reinforce their personal image and gain international support from 
other leaders and the international public opinion.  
H3. Presidents use declaratory regionalism if presidential elections are to take place in the following 
one-year period. 
Following the same logic, presidents could also try to bolster their international and domestic support 
in a context of decaying presidential image. 
H4. Presidents use declaratory regionalism if presidential image is declining. 
Data on “confidence in the government” was also borrowed from the Democracy Barometer as a 
proxy of presidential image. 
Amongst domestic constituencies, idea of a patria grande (the greater motherland) has traditionally 
been a strong current especially in Latin American leftist ideology and culture, mostly under the frame 
of Latin-Americanism (Beverley 2011). Spanning not only politics but also literature and arts, Latin-
Americanism has had a strong stand in the most progressive electorate, which appropriated the 
regional discourse as part of a mostly anti-American, anti-capitalist intellectual tradition (Corrales and 
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Feinberg 1999). As noticed by Olivier Dabène “the leftist discourse is ambiguous to the extent that it 
uses integration as an instrument to defend the sovereignty of these countries against the threat of 
imperialism” (2012: 367). These narratives are at the heart of what José Antonio Sanahuja has called 
“post-liberal” regionalism, “a summit diplomacy with high political profile and media exposure which, 
besides its integrationist discourse constitutes, above all, a frame for south-south cooperation” (2009: 
29 [translated by the authors]).  
If media exposure and inflationist discourse characterize Latin America’s “post-liberal” 
regionalism, we should expect leftist presidents to be more prone to declaratory regionalism than their 
counterparts from the centre and the right of the political spectrum.
 5
 Hence, 
H5. Declaratory regionalism is more often used by leftist presidents in the UNGA.  
Another, fairly obvious hypothesis included as a control is that the discursive regionalism increases at 
the very moment a new international organization is created. Governments may want to promote the 
new framework, or simply announce its coming into existence to an international audience. Therefore: 
H6. Governments refer to the region when a new regime is launched.  
As with H4, regime launch is included in the dataset as a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the 
country begins its membership in a newly created or already exiting regional organization in that year.  
Finally, the model considers another dummy variable accounting for whether a country is 
represented at the UNGA by the president in person or by a deputy.  
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 For the present analysis, based on Levitsky and Roberts (2013), the following presidents were considered to be leftist: 
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(Brazil), Evo Morales (Bolivia), Eduardo Frei (Chile), Ricardo Lagos (Chile), Michelle Bachelet (Chile), Rafael Correa 
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Hugo Chávez (Venezuela). 
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Results 
A linear regression on panel data explores the relation between talk about the region in the yearly 
speeches delivered at the UNGA and the aforementioned set of possible explanations. 
Table 3. OLS regression results on declaratory regionalism 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 
Domestic Stability 
 
-0.0001 
(0.0129) 
 
-0.0009 
(0.0132) 
 
External Stability 
 
0.7818 
(0.6215) 
 
0.8424 
(0.7026) 
 
Presidential Elections 
 
0.0365 
(0.6215) 
 
0.1589 
(0.6299) 
 
Leftist President 
 
     1.3661** 
(0.5649) 
 
    1.2414** 
(0.6194) 
 
Regime Launch 
 
0.0264 
(0.5801) 
 
-0.0465 
(0.5864) 
 
Confidence in the Government 
  
 _ 
 
0.0038 
(0.0146) 
 
Economic Growth 
 
_ 
 
 
0.0499 
(0.0693) 
 
Presidential Statement 
 
 
 
 
-0.8416 
(0.5607) 
R2  0.04 0.05 
F Statistic 1.73 (df=5/203) 1.49 (df=8/200) 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 90%, 95% and 99% level, respectively. 
The first model tests for H1 (domestic crises), H2 (international disputes), H3 (presidential elections), 
H5 (regime ideology) and H6 (regime launch). The second model includes the variables “confidence 
in the government” and “economic growth” as annual growth rate reported by World Bank statistics, 
to test for H4, and also includes a control for the years when the president does not deliver the speech. 
In both, only the fact of the president being leftist is statistically significant, being the effect of 
presidential ideology slightly lower in Model 2. On average, presidents refer to the region 4.7 times in 
each speech they deliver to the UNGA. Being a leftist president accounts for a significant increase of 
around 1.3 allusions to the region, which is a considerable difference if compared to the mean. 
Amongst the other factors included in the models, the test of instability as a factor triggering a 
regionalist discourse shows that at least as measured here, internal and external security considerations 
do not bear any impact upon presidential speeches. This does not discard the subaltern regionalist 
hypothesis, which suggests that governments turn to the region under conditions of domestic 
instability, but rather explains why presidents sometimes talk about regionalism in contexts that are 
not straightforwardly propitious neither for cooperation nor integration. 
Nicole Jenne and Luis Schenoni 
12 
Although the explanatory power of the models is significantly limited, the fact that regime ideology 
stands out as the best explanation for declarationist practices is an interesting finding, since a link to 
the integration literature is not easily made. Ernst Haas, the founding father of neofunctionalist 
integration theory, was reluctant to concede any role to ideology when writing on the European 
Communities in the 1950s. Instead, he considered ideology as “merely a mood, an ambiance that 
remains compatible with the attenuated national consciousness” in Europe (Haas 1958: xxix). In the 
discipline of International Relations, the end of the Cold War further discredited theorizing ideology. 
Our findings suggest that ideology may indeed play a role in regionalism, or at the very least in the 
making of regionalist speeches in Latin America. 
The idea of a common Latin American identity, as stated above, has transcended two centuries 
from Simon Bolivar to Chávez’s Bolivarianism and is still a matter of passionate discussion among 
leftist intellectuals (Beverley 2011; Moreiras 1998). Over time, presidents have appropriated it for 
different projects, but its major characteristic remained being a marked feature of leftist discourse in 
the region, associated with the attempt to limit US-influence. In addition to this long-standing 
tradition, the upsurge in regional dynamism Latin America witnessed in the first decade of the new 
millennium was seen as closely connected to the rise of a ‘new left’ (Weyland et.al. 2010; Levitzky 
and Roberts 2013) that emphasized the necessity to move away from the failing model of economic 
neoliberalism (Rodríguez-Garavito et. al. 2008, 5, 9). 
Having said so, it is worth noting that leftist governments in the region have not built strong 
institutions leading to deeper integration. Recent creations such as UNASUR and ALBA were 
distinctly leftist projects, though considerable progress in various policy areas notwithstanding, both 
organizations are fundamentally intergovernmental. What is more, “neo-liberal” or “rightist” 
governments had implemented their own kind of regionalism before, leading to similar – if not better – 
results: MERCOSUR, for instance, was created at the apex of neo-liberalism in the region. Therefore, 
it seems the tendency of leftist politicians to make more references to the region in their speeches has 
led to “tensions between ideology and pragmatism” in Latin American regionalism (Gardini 2011, 
236). This apparent contradiction between leftist regional discourse and poor integration was noticed 
by Dabène (2012), who suggested that it may be explained by the limited room for manoeuvre of post-
neoliberal leftist governments vis-à-vis societal actors and the greater flexibility of presidential 
summits, that allowed them to manage regional governance pragmatically.  
Within the leftist camp, those most radical in rhetoric and action were criticized most openly for 
being populist whilst not achieving concrete results (Castañeda 2006; Villalobos 2004). However, the 
relation between a “radical”, “populist” left led by Hugo Chávez and including, inter alia, Rafael 
Correa and Evo Morales, and a “moderate” left (exemplarily the Chilean Concertación under Ricardo 
Lagos and Michele Bachelet, Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva) has been complementary rather than 
antithetical (see Ellner 2012).  
In terms of policy strategy, the finding that ideology impacts on the use of declarationism at the 
UNGA is thus in accordance with Sanahuja’s claim that a defining cleavage exists between “post-
liberal” (leftist) and “neo-liberal” (rightist) regionalisms, the first being characterized, among other 
things, by an appealing narrative component with stronger presence in the political discourse. The 
Latin-Americanist discourse notwithstanding, three distinct features of the ‘new left’ made it more 
keen to discursive regionalism: First, the prominence of civil society is a common characteristic in the 
new leftism that lends itself to using the popular stage for declarationism, including regarding regional 
integration. Second, the general reliance of leftist governments on direct forms of political 
representation rather than on bureaucratic structures (Lomnitz 2006) further underscores the value of 
the public stage for the left. Third, the scope of areas of cooperation envisaged by post-liberal 
regionalism – across social, political, military and economic policies – is far more suitable to the broad 
agenda of the ‘new left’. While declaratory regionalism should serve right and leftist governments 
equally as a low-risk instrument of moderate cost at the most to creating a stable regional 
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environment, the neoliberals’ more limited commercialist agenda may have provided fewer 
opportunities. 
Moreover, one may argue, it was the deliberate choice of the centre-right to abstain from discursive 
regionalism as such could antagonize the US as long as it is not couched in hemispheric terms. This 
may explain the temporal coincidence between post-liberal regionalism (Sanahuja 2009), post-
hegemonic regionalism (Riggirozzi and Tussie 2012) and the particular understanding of regionalism 
of the so-called ‘pink tide’ of Latin American leftist presidents (Gardini 2011). 
The rhetoric of integration appears to follow primarily an intramural logic. Writing on the role of 
ideology in Latin American foreign policy, Gardini claimed that it “serves the interests of politicians 
and the media and nourishes civil society’s sense of belonging to the great Latin American family” 
(2011: 246). Declaratory regionalism then likely reflects the ideological self-conception and political 
calculus of leftist politicians who see their countries as forming part of a broader region, to which they 
naturally refer in their foreign policy discourses at the UNGA. 
6. Conclusions 
The paper set out to shed light on the often-noted phenomenon of Latin America’s declaratory 
regionalism; that is, the persistence of rhetorical affirmations of regional integration. Making 
statements and non-binding commitments was of striking significance in the speeches Latin American 
presidencies delivered at the annual conventions of the UN General Assembly. Variation in the use of 
discursive regionalism between actors and across time, we argued in sections 3 and 4, resembles 
patterns in actual regional policy strategies. Therefore, unpacking the phenomenon of declaratory 
regionalism may offer valuable clues regarding regionalism in practice. 
The results of our linear regression model can only serve as a signpost, yet they offer an interesting 
insight well in line with existing scholarship on Latin American international politics. The relevance 
of regime ideology, which is the only factor that has a statistically significant impact in the model, 
may not come to the surprise of Latin Americanists. Nevertheless, it is a neglected issue in theories on 
regionalism and regional integration. We proposed several possible explanations relating regime 
ideology to discursive regionalism at the UNGA, which further research may scrutinize. 
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